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PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS
OF SEEKING A TAX REFUND
William H. Baker*
It is entirely possible for a taxpayer to overpay his income taxes
for a particular year but be unable to secure a refund of the overpay-
ment. In order to assert successfully his right to a refund, the taxpayer
must follow precisely the statutory procedure established for that pur-
pose. He should be familiar with important decisions bearing on pro-
cedural and jurisdictional questions.
There are two procedures available to the taxpayer who believes
that he has overpaid his income taxes. He must first proceed adminis-
tratively by filing a claim for refund' with the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. If that procedure does not prove successful, he may seek a re-
fund by litigating his case2 either in the appropriate United States dis-
trict court or in the United States Court of Claims.3 Refund suits in
these courts are brought against the United States.4 Three sections of
the Internal Revenue Code should be given particular attention. 5
* Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; A.B., Duke
University; J.D., University of Maryland.
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7422(a) [hereinafter cited as Code]; Treas. Regs.
§ 301.6402-2(a)(1).
2. Code § 7422(a).
3. 28 U.S.C. 1346 (1970) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the
Court of Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,
or any penalty claimed to have been collectd without authority or any sum
alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under
the internal-revenue laws;. ...
28 U.S.C. 1491 (1970) provides:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress, or any iegulation of an executive depa tment, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliqui-
dated damages in cases not sounding m Tort. . ..
4. Code § 7422(f)(1).
5. Code H§ 6511, 6532, 7422.
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Section 7422(a) provides that no suits for a tax refund may be
maintained "until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the Secretary or his delegate, according to the provisions of law in that
regard, and the regulations of the Secretary or his delegate established
in pursuance thereof." Accordingly, a prerequisite to bringing a tax
refund suit against the United States is the proper filing of the claim
for refund.
Section 6532 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the period
of limitations on suits and indicates6 that no tax refund suits under 7422
"shall be begun before the expiration of 6 months from the date of
filing the claim required . . . unless the Secretary or his delegate ren-
ders a decision thereon within that time. . . ." In other words, once
a claim for refund is disallowed, suit may be instituted immediately.
That section also provides that a tax refund suit cannot be instituted
after two years have expired from the date the notice of disallowance
of the claim is mailed to the taxpayer by certified mail or registered
mail. The two year period can be extended by a written agreement
between the Secretary or his delegate and the taxpayer or his attorney,
or someone else having the authority to act on the taxpayer's behalf.7
If the taxpayer files a written waiver of the requirement that he be
mailed a notice of disallowance, the two year period will begin when
the waiver is filed.8 The regulations specifically provide, however, that
the filing of a waiver by the taxpayer prior to the expiration of six
months from the date the refund claim was filed will not permit the
taxpayer to institute suit against the United States before the six month
period has expired.9 Once a notice of disallowance of a claim for re-
fund has been mailed by the Internal Revenue Service, any subsequent
action taken by the Service with respect to the claim will not extend
the time for filing suit by the taxpayer. 10
Section 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code provides limitations
for the filing of a claim for credit or refund. The basic rule provided
by that section is that a claim for refund or credit must be filed within
three years from the time the return was filed or two years from the
time the tax was paid, whichever gives the taxpayer more time." Sec-
tion 6511(b)(1) provides that no refund or credit will be allowed after
6. Code § 6532(a)(1).
7. Code § 6532(a) (2); Treas. Reg. § 301.6532-1(b).
8. Code § 6532(a) (3); Treas. Reg. § 301.6532-1(c).
9. Treas. Reg. § 301.6532-1(c) (4).
10. Code § 6532(a) (4); Treas. Reg. § 301.6532-1(d).
11. Code § 6511(a).
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the expiration of the limitation period set forth above unless a claim
for refund or credit is timely filed.
Even though a claim for refund is timely filed in accordance with
the rules set forth above, the Code establishes a limit on the amount
which is refundable.12 Where the claim is filed within the three year
period, the amount of the refund cannot exceed the tax paid within a
period immediately prior to the filing of the claim equal to three years
plus the time covered by any extension for filing the return.1 3 If, how-
ever, the claim for refund was not filed within the three year period,
the amount of the refund or credit cannot exceed the amount of the
tax paid during the two years immediately preceding the filing of the
claim.14  This section also contains provisions pertaining to various
specific situations. 5 Any taxpayer who seeks to secure a tax refund
should be familiar with the provisions of the three sections of the Code
referred to above.
In addition to the above sections of the Internal Revenue Code
which are extremely important, the provisions of the United States
Code granting jurisdiction to the federal district courts and the Court
of Claims in refund suits are provisions with which every tax practitioner
will be familiar. 16
Claims for Refund
What constitutes a valid claim for refund? The regulations pro-
videl' that in seeking a refund of income tax, an individual taxpayer
is encouraged to use Form 1040X (amended income tax return). He
may also use Form 843 (claim for refund), which is also the proper
form to use for a refund of taxes other than income taxes.' 8 These
are not the only documents which may constitute a claim for refund.
An original income tax return may constitute a claim for refund where
the return shows an overpayment and the taxpayer has requested the
overpayment be returned to him or credited to his estimated taxes for
12. Code § 6511(b) (2) (A).
13. Id.
14. Code § 6511(b) (2) (B).
15. Section 6511(d) of the Code provides special limitations rules in the case of
bad debts and worthless securities, net operating losses for capital loss carrybacks, the
foreign tax credit, investment credit carrybacks, self-employment tax in certain cases, re-
duction of policy-holders surplus account from life insurance companies and work incen-
tive program carrybacks.
16. Footnote 3 supra.
17. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(2).
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(c).
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the next year.19 In fact, it is possible for a claim for refund to take
many forms. A document can constitute a claim for refund if it notifies
the Commissioner of the taxpayer's belief that he has erroneously over-
paid his taxes, sets forth precisely the grounds for believing that the
tax was overpaid and indicates that the taxpayer is seeking a refund
or credit of the overpaid taxes.2 0  A Form 870 on which the taxpayer
agrees to an overassessment of taxes will constitute a valid claim for
refund if it is timely filed. Where the overassessment has been deter-
mined by the Service, it is apprised of the taxpayer's desire for a refund
together with the grounds on which such desire is based.2 On the
other hand, if the Form 870 was submitted by the taxpayer prior to
the assessment of a deficiency against him, Barenfeld v. United States22
demonstrates that the Form 870 will be treated as the mere waiver of
the statute of limitations on assessment. In that instance, because the
document did not advise the government of the taxpayer's desire to
seek a refund of a deficiency which might be assessed for the year in
question, it could not be treated as a claim for refund. In that case,
the formal claim for refund was filed after the statute of limitations had
run.
When thinking in terms of seeking a refund of income taxes, one
should realize that the refund will relate either to taxes paid by the
taxpayer as part of his liability shown on his original tax return, or to
a deficiency of taxes which is subsequently paid by the taxpayer after
the Service has determined that an additional amount is due. We are
assuming a situation where the taxpayer decided to permit the defi-
ciency to be assessed against him so that he could then file a claim
for refund to recover it. If the claim failed, he could institute a suit
for refund. If after filing his original tax return, the taxpayer receives
a notice of deficiency (ninety-day letter) advising him that the Service
has determined that additional taxes are owing, he may, of course, de-
cide to litigate the matter in the United States Tax Court and, in that
event, the case will be decided before he is required to pay additional
tax. 3 Hence, claims for refund would not be part of that procedure.
The two most important aspects of claims for refund are timeliness
and statement of grounds.
19. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(1).
20. Barenfield v. United States, 442 F.2d 371 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Stuart v. United
States, 130 F. Supp. 386 (Ct. CI. 1955); Cumberland Portland Cement Co. v. United
States, 104 F. Supp. 1010 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
21. Rev. Rul. 68-65, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 555.
22. 442 F.2d 371 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
23. Code § 6213(a).
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Timeliness of Claims for Refund
In considering the question of whether or not a properly executed
claim for refund is timely filed, as previously indicated, the basic rule
is that the claim must be made within three years of the filing of the
return or within two years of the payment of the tax, whichever extends
the time period longer in the taxpayer's favor.
If the claim for refund is delivered by the United States mail to
its destination,24 the claim will be treated as having been filed on the
date of the United States postmark on the envelope containing it.25 If
the postmark date is on or before the final day for filing the claim,
it will be treated as timely20 even though the Internal Revenue Service
may not receive the claim until many additional days have elapsed. If
a taxpayer sends the claim by registered mail, the date of registration
will be considered the date of the postmark.27  If the taxpayer sends
the claim by certified mail and his receipt is postmarked by a postal
employee, that postmark will be treated as the date the claim was post-
marked.25 If the last day for filing the claim falls on a Saturday, Sun-
day or legal holiday, the filing will be timely if it takes place on the
next succeeding day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.20
The last date for filing the claim takes into consideration authorized
extensions of time which have been granted.3 °
If the claim is to be filed with reference to the return date, when
is the tax return treated as filed? If the return is filed prior to its due
date, it will be treated as filed on the due date for purposes of deter-
mining the point at which the statute of limitations begins to run. An
extension of time for filing the return will not be taken into considera-
tion in this regard." What this rule really means is that if an extension
of time has been granted, but the taxpayer files his return prior to the
normal statutory date for filing anyway, the return will be treated as
filed on the statutory filing date (April 15th) despite the fact that an
24. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(a) (2) provides that as to claims for refund filed after
April 14, 1968, except where the claim should be filed with the Director of International
Operations or with the assistant regional commissioner if the tax is an alcohol, tobacco
or firearms tax, the claim must be filed with the service center serving the internal-reve-
nue district in which the tax was paid.
25. Code § 7502(a)(1).
26. Code § 7501(a) (2) (A).
27. Treas. Reg. § 301.7502-1(c)(2).
28. Id.
29. Code § 7503.
30. Id.
31. Treas. Reg. § 301.6513-1 (a).
366 [Vol. 10:362
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extension has been granted. If the return is filed after the normal date
for filing, the return will be treated as having been filed on the actual
date of filing.32
Timeliness with Reference to Payment Date
As indicated above, if a taxpayer's claim for refund is to be filed
with reference to the payment date of his taxes, a claim must be filed
within two years of the time the tax was paid. When is the tax treated
as paid? In the case of withholding tax, tax is withheld from an em-
ployee's salary at regular pay periods during the course of the year.
The Code provides33 that as to withholding taxes, the actual amount
withheld is treated as paid "on the 15th day of the fourth month follow-
ing the close of his taxable year. . . ." Estimated tax payments are
deemed paid on the last day designated for filing the tax return for
the year in question (without regard to any extension of time which
may have been granted for filing the return.)
Before the statute read as it presently does, section 322(e) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided that the estimated tax pay-
ments "shall be deemed to have been paid not earlier than the 15th
day of the third month following the close of such taxable year."3 In
cases where the income tax return was filed after its due date, and
claims for refund were subsequently filed within three years of the ac-
tual date on which the return was filed, the claims were held to be
timely as to the payments because it was held that the tax could not
be deemed "paid" until the liability was defined by a return. 35 If the
same factual situations were to arise under the present wording of sec-
tion 6513 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the taxpayers would
lose their argument because payment of the estimated tax would be
deemed to be made on the date the return was due. A late filed return
would have no bearing on when the estimated taxes were treated as
paid.
But the question of when a tax is deemed paid may still be open
to question in the case of an asserted deficiency. There have been
several key cases involving the question of whether a remittance of a
32. Foster v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
33. Code § 6513(b)(1).
34. Act of Oct. 21, 1942, § 172(e), 56 Stat. 893.
35. Plankinton v. United States, 267 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1959); Schmidt v. Comm'r,
272 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1959); Trevelyan v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn.
1963).
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particular sum prior to the actual determination of the tax liability, con-
stitutes "payment" of the tax."
In Rosenman v. United States, the basic case on this point, the
executors of a descedent's estate received an extension of time for fil-
ing the estate tax return to February 25, 1935, but could not get an
extension of time for paying the tax.
Accordingly, they delivered to the Service on December 24, 1934,
a check in the amount of $120,000.00 stating at the time that the check
was payment on account of federal estate tax, that it was made under
protest since all of it was not due, and that it was being made for the
purpose of avoiding penalties and interest. The estate tax return was
filed on February 25, 1935, showing estate tax due of $80,224.24.
The Commissioner used funds in the suspense account to credit against
this liability. Subsequently, it was determined that the total tax due
was $128,759.08, and a deficiency of $48,534.84 was assessed in April
1938. The balance ($39,775.76) in the suspense account was ap-
plied against the deficiency, and the balance of $10,497.34 was paid
by the taxpayer to cover the balance of the deficiency plus interest.
On May 20, 1940 the taxpayers filed a claim for refund for $24,717.12.
Except as to the $10,497.34 payment, the claim for refund was rejected
on the ground that the tax claimed to have been illegally paid was
"paid" more than three years prior to the filing of the claim.
But the Supreme Court held that the tax could not have been
"paid" before the Commissioner's assessment of April 1938. Rejecting
the government's argument that the tax was "paid" on December 24,
1934 when the taxpayer transferred the $120,000.00 check to the col-
lector, the Court stated -that on that date, "the taxpayer did not dis-
charge what he deemed a liability nor pay one that was asserted."
There could not be a payment of the tax until it was formally defined by
assessment. Only at that time could the remittance made by the tax-
payer be applied against a specific liability and, accordingly, be treated
as a payment. The Court also noted that the government had not
treated such "deposits" as payments for purposes of fixing the date
from which interest would be paid by the government on an amount
subsequently assessed. The Court concluded that if the deposit was not
36. Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658 (1945); Lewyt Corp. v. Comm'r, 215
F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1954), a!f'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 349 U.S. 237
(1955); Thomas v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 204 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1953); United States
v, Dubuque Packing Co., 233 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1956).
[Vol. 10:362
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payment for such interest purposes, it could not be payment for pur-
poses of barring suit by the taxpayer for its illegal retention.
One should be careful to note that the Rosenman case cannot be
interpreted as authority for the proposition that all remittances made
prior to assessment will not constitute "payment." The crucial point
is that if the taxpayer believes that he is "paying" a tax, and the govern-
ment has the same understanding, the remittance will be treated as a
tax payment. In Ameel v. United States,37 a voluntary remittance of
a proposed deficiency was held to be "payment" even though the tax
in question had not yet been assessed. In that case, the remittance
was made when the taxpayer agreed with the internal revenue agent
that the additional amount which he contended was due, was in fact
due. The agent had prepared a computation of tax due and presented
it to the taxpayer. Distinguishing the case from Rosenman, the Court
pointed out that in Rosenman, the parties had stipulated that the remit-
tance be placed in a suspense account subject to recall by the taxpayer
on request any time before the assessment. But in Ameel, the tax-
payer agreed with the agent that a specific computation of additional
tax owing was correct, and he was discharging what he believed to be
a liability. 38
If the taxpayer has filed a Consent (form 872) which has the ef-
fect of extending the normal period during which the Commissioner
can assess a deficiency, the claim for refund can be filed within six
months after the extended period provided in the Consent expires or
within two years after the tax is paid, whichever is to the taxpayer's
advantage.3 9
SUBSTANCE OF CLAIMS
Importance of Accurate Statement of Grounds
The Code and Regulations clearly specify the requirement that a
claim for refund be filed, the time requirements relating to the filing,
and requirements relating to the contents of such claims.40 It, there-
fore, is clear that a claim for refund cannot be prosecuted successfully
in the federal courts unless it has been timely filed and filed in a com-
37. 426 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1970).
38. See also Fehrs Finance Co. v. Comm'r, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973) where
the concept that "payment" can occur prior to formal assessment was cited with ap-
proval.
39. Code § 6511(c)(1).
40. Code §§ 7422(a), 6511(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1).
1975]
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plete and detailed manner.41 The reason that the taxpayer is required
in his claim for refund to set forth in detail each ground upon which
recovery is sought and facts relating to each ground upon which recov-
ery is sought is so that the Internal Revenue Service will know pre-
cisely the exact reason why the taxpayer claims a refund together with
the factual basis for the claim. In that way, the Commissioner will be
able to pass on the claim and be in a position to prevent undue delay
and expensive court proceedings. 42 If the taxpayer's claim for refund
is inadequate, and he attempts to correct the defect by stating correct
grounds for recovery in his complaint filed in the federal courts, the
result will be a fatal variance and the court will lack jurisdiction to hear
the case. Such a result occurred in Automated Marketing Systems,
Inc. v. United States.43 In that case, the controversy related to a deter-
mination by the internal revenue agent that the method of accounting
used by the taxpayer did not properly reflect income for the years in
question. In its claim for refund, the taxpayer set forth as its ground
for recovery the contention that its method of accounting did, in fact,
clearly reflect income and that, therefore, the deficiency was errone-
ously assessed and collected. In its suit in the District court, the plain-
tiff moved for summary judgment arguing that the tax deficiency which
was assessed was ultra vires because the government representative
who found the taxpayer's accounting methods inadequate had no au-
thority to make such a determination, and even if he did have such
authority, he did not make the determination in the manner required.
In ruling for the government, the court stated,
the plaintiffs statement of claim can only be read as contest-
ing whether its method of accounting accurately reflected its
income. No other ground than this is discernible in the
plaintiff's statement. The fact the Petitioner has contested
the determination on the "merits," to use the term loosely,
does not focus any attention on whether initial grants of stat-
utory authority to the Secretary of the Treasury have been
properly redelegated down to the agent of the IRS who made
the determination.
Although conceding that the court might review additional grounds
which are inherent in the initial claim for refund, the court found that
the taxpayer was not advancing such a "factually-related" ground. The
court added,
41. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946); United States
v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 283 U.S. 269 (1931).
42. Taber v. U.S., 59 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1932).
43. AM. FED. TAx R.2d 73-386 (N.D. 11. 1972).
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To assume that the Commissioner, in considering the merits
of the claim directly under the elements of the 446(b) would
have ascertained that his legal capacity to make the deter-
mination in the first instance was being challenged by the
taxpayer, is to go beyond even the most liberal reading of
Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. 6402-2(b) that a claim
should set forth facts to fairly apprise the Commissioner of
the basis of his claim.44
A taxpayer cannot simply attach a copy of the internal revenue
agent's report determining the tax deficiency to a claim for refund
form and add a statement that the deficiency set forth in the attached
"exhibit" was erroneously and improperly collected.45  Such a pro-
cedure by the taxpayer does not advise the Commissioner of the nature
of each ground for recovery being asserted by the taxpayer.
In Old Dominion Box Co., Inc. v. Unite4 States46 the taxpayer's
claim for refund stated that the disallowance of a charitable contribu-
tion was improper where the contribution was made to a foundation
which was a qualified charitable entity and the taxpayer innocently
made its contributions in good faith in reliance on the donee's chari-
table status. While the taxpayer's refund suit was pending and after
the period of limitations had expired on filing a refund claim, the com-
pany amended its complaint to allege that the contribution in question
was intended for and received by an art center which was a charitable
corporation and that, therefore, the contributions were deductible.
The court noted that the original claim for refund stated that the foun-
dation was the charity and the taxpayer an innocent contributor and
it contained no mention of the art center and no suggestion that the
taxpayer was relying on the theory that the foundation served only as
a conduit through which the contribution passed to the art center. The
amendment of the complaint was held to raise a new and different
ground and, accordingly, the merits of the claim were never reached.47
The Court of Claims has taken a rather lenient view with regard
to changing the basis for a claim for refund. In National Forge and
Ordnance Co. v. United States,4" the taxpayer's original claim for re-
44. Id. at 73-388.
45. John P. Lynch Co. v. United States, 32 Am. FED. TAX R.2d 73-5130 (C.D.
Calif. 1973).
46. 477 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973).
47. See also United States v. Andrews, 302 U.S. 517 (1938); Sappington v. United
States, 408 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1969); Campagna v. United States, 290 F.2d 682 (2d
Cir. 1961); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. United States, 427 F.2d 749 (Ct. C1. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943.
48. 151 F. Supp. 937 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
1975]
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss3/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
fund alleged a net operating loss for 1944, part of which was subject
to carryback resulting in a refund of taxes for 1942, 1943 and 1944.
A subsequent Supreme Court decision defeated the basis of the tax-
payer's 1944 net operating loss and, after the statute of limitations on
filing a timely claim for refund had run, the taxpayer filed an amend-
ment to its original claim stating that the net operating loss occurred
in 1945 rather than 1944. Although the court expressed difficulty
with the taxpayer's position, it permitted the amended claim for refund
to be a proper basis for the suit. Subsequent Court of Claims decisions
have applied this liberal approach to this issue.4 9  It has been sug-
gested that a failure to comply with the strict requirements of the Regu-
lations with respect to alleging grounds and supporting facts in detail
in a claim for refund should not defeat a taxpayer's suit where the in-
adequacies of the claim may be corrected without any harm resulting
to the government as a result.50
Amount of Claim for Refund
As indicated above, it is extremely important for the taxpayer to
allege in his claim for refund the precise grounds for recovery and facts
underlying those grounds. Is it also essential that the taxpayer com-
pute the precise amount refundable under the theory of his claim for
refund? In Burrell v. Fahs"1 the government argued that even though
the claims for refund in question did properly raise the issue involved,
the taxpayers could not recover because they had not established the
exact amount which should be refunded to them. In reply to that argu-
ment, the court stated: "The statute and the regulation, herein quoted,
impose no such burden. It is the basis of the claim that must be stated
with exactitude." 52  Although it is not necessary for the taxpayer to
set forth in a claim for refund the exact amount due under the theories
alleged, it is considered good practice for a taxpayer to compute, as
best he can, the amount which he believes to be refundable and then
add a phrase such as "or such amount as may be properly due in ac-
cordance with applicable provisions of law, together with interest."5
49. Pearl Assurance Co. v. United States, 324 F.2d 512 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Manufac-
turers' Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 785 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Sparton Corp.
v. United States, 279 F.2d 264 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
50. D. Adams, The Imperfect Claim for Refund, 22 TAx LAWYER 309, 338 (1968).
51. 232 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1956).
52. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
53. In this regard, see the suggestion along these lines by Samuel Brodsky in What
to do about Claims and Suits for Refund, TAx IDEAs (vol. 2) para. 28,001.
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The taxpayer has recovered the proper amount due even though the
complaint specifically requested less than what was due.5" Use of the
quoted phrase above has helped the taxpayer in litigation.55
Requirement that Tax Be Paid in Full before Suit for Refund
Can Be Brought
In the case of income, estate, and gift taxes and the excise tax
based on investment income as applied to private foundations, when a
taxpayer receives a notice of deficiency indicating that additional tax
is due over and above that shown on his return, he has the right to
file a petition in the United States Tax Court which has jurisdiction to
determine the correct amount of the deficiency which was referred to
in the notice of deficiency. The general rule is that if a taxpayer
files a petition in the Tax Court, the deficiency cannot be assessed and
collection proceedings cannot be begun until the decision of the Tax
Court becomes final. 7 An exception to this rule is provided in the
case of jeopardy assessments.58 In the case of a jeopardy assessment,
the assessment of the deficiency and the collection of the amount owed
can take place before the notice of deficiency has been issued. Section
6861 of the Code provides that the notice of deficiency shall be mailed
within sixty days after the assessment is made.5"
Once the taxpayer receives the notice of deficiency, he is pre-
sented with a choice. He may file a petition in the Tax Court and
have the correctness of the deficiency determined prior to his paying
any amount whatsoever with respect to the proposed deficiency. On
the other hand, he may decide to waive his right to petition the Tax
Court, permit the proposed deficiency to be assessed, pay the amount
of the assessment, file a claim for refund and then eventually file a
suit for refund to recover the amount in question. As previously indi-
cated, the timely filing of a proper claim for refund is a prerequisite
to a suit for refund. In addition to the problems which have arisen
concerning the timeliness and adequacy of claims for refund, questions
54. Pink v. United States, 105 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939).
55. Dixie Margarine Co. v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 543 (Ct. Cl. 1935).
56. Code §§ 6213, 6214.
57. Code § 6213.
58. Code § 6861.
59. Code § 6861(b) provides:
DEFICIENCY LETT RS.-If the jeopardy assessment is made before any notice
in respect of the tax to which the jeopardy assessment relates has been mailed
under section 6212(a), then the Secretary or his delegate shall mail a notice
under such subsection within 60 days after the making of the assessment.
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have arisen concerning the amount which the taxpayer is required to
pay in order to maintain a suit for refund.
Section 1346 of title 28 of the Code provides that the United
States District Courts and the United States Court of Claims shall have
concurrent jurisdiction of
[any civil action against the United States for the recovery of
any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or il-
legally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have
been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the
internal-revenue laws. .... 0
The question which has arisen is whether or not a taxpayer may
pay less than the total amount of the assessment made against him and
still maintain a suit for refund under section 1346. The landmark case
which dealt with this problem is Flora v. United States."' In that case
the deficiency assessment amounted to $28,908.60, including interest.
The taxpayer paid only $5,058.54 and then filed a claim for refund
of that amount. When the claim was disallowed by the District Direc-
tor, the taxpayer instituted a suit for refund in the appropriate United
States District Court. The government filed a motion to dismiss. 2
The taxpayer argued that the language of the statute indicated that a
full payment of the deficiency assessment was not a jurisdictional condi-
tion precedent to maintaining the suit for refund in the district court.
The Supreme Court, however, after looking into the legislative history
and background of section 1346(a)(1) concluded that the assessment
had to be paid in full before the suit for refund could be maintained.
The court stated: "Reargument has but fortified our view that §1346
(a)(1), correctly construed, requires full payment of the assessment
before an income tax refund suit can be maintained in a Federal Dis-
trict Court."6 3
The Flora decision- has continued to require interpretation. In
Kell-Strom Tool Co. v. United States 4 the total amount of the assess-
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).
61. 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
62. A motion to dismiss is filed under Rule 12 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDtmE. Rule 12(b) provides in part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether
a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following de-
fenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of juris-
diction over the subject matter. ...
63. 362 U.S. at 177.
64. 205 F. Supp. 190 (D. Conn. 1962).
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ment in question was $25,955.32 which consisted of tax in the amount
of $22,943.81 and interest of $3,011.51. The taxpayer paid only the
amount of the tax-$22,843.82-and it instituted a suit for refund to
recover only the amount of the tax and none of the interest. The dis-
trict court in Kell-Strom concluded that the Flora case had not decided
that both the tax and the interest assessed had to be paid as a condition
precedent for jurisdiction of the district court to attach. It held that
only the tax had to be paid in order for the district court to acquire
a jurisdiction over a tax refund suit. The effect of the Kell-Strom de-
cision was to interpret section 1346(a)(1) as referring to only tax and
not interest.
The year after the Kell-Strom case was decided, a circuit court
holding reached the opposite result.6 5 In Kisting v. Sauber the tax-
payers filed their income tax return for 1954 on April 15, 1955, indi-
cating a tax liability of $27,542.46 of which $10,021.49 had been paid
through withholding and estimated tax payments. The balance due of
$17,520.77 was due with the tax return. Subsequently, on June 7,
1955, the taxpayers filed an amended return together with a claim for
refund in the amount of $2,222.55. The difference between the recom-
puted tax shown to be due on the amended return and the amount of
tax already paid in the form of withholding and estimated taxes with
the original return constituted the amount of the claim for refund.
Years later, in 1960, the Commissioner made an additional assessment
of unpaid income taxes, interest, fraud penalties and estimated tax
panalties in the amount of $27,418.19 for the year 1954. The refund
suit was instituted by the taxpayers on October 31, 1961, and the gov-
ernment moved to dismiss based on the Flora decision. The court
noted that before the taxpayer had instituted the refund suit in 1961,
it had been served on September 9, 1960 with a notice of deficiency
in accordance with the requirements of section 6212(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. Accordingly, they would have been entitled
to litigate the year 1954 in the Tax Court without paying the amount
covered by the notice of deficiency. They failed to petition the Tax
Court, and the court held that because the total amount of the assess-
ment had not been paid, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
case. The court stated: "Having made their choice, the district court
had no jurisdiction except to dismiss their action upon defendant's mo-
tion when it appeared that plaintiffs had not paid in full the taxes, inter-
65. Kisting v. Sauber, 325 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1963).
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est and penalties assessed against them."0 6 Accordingly, it seems clear
that under the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Flora case, all of
the amounts assessed-taxes, penalties and interest-must be paid in
full before a suit for refund can be maintained.
There are exceptions to the rule that the total amount of the
assessment must first be paid before a tax refund suit can be main-
tained. But unfortunately for the average individual taxpayer, these
exceptions would not be available in the usual income tax controversy.
One of the cases which demonstrates an exception to the rule requiring
full payment of a tax assessment is Jones v. Fox.7 That case involved
a cabaret excise tax assessment, and the taxpayer sued for a refund
after having only partially satisfied the assessment. The government
contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case be-
cause the assessment had not been paid in full. The court, however,
held that it had jurisdiction and pointed out that in the case of an excise
tax, the Tax Court has no jurisdiction to settle controversies. Accord-
ingly, if a taxpayer, in the case of an excise tax, were required to pay
the total amount of the assessment before he could get a judicial inter-
pretation he would be denied the choice available to taxpayers seeking
to contest income, estate or gift tax proposed deficiencies. As indi-
cated above, in the case of those types of taxes, the taxpayer has a
choice of either having the Tax Court decide his case before the assess-
ment is paid or paying the assessment first and then suing to recover
it in either the appropriate United States District Court or the United
States Court of Claims. As authority for its holding that it had jurisdic-
tion, the court relied on Friebele v. United States8 which involved
documentary stamp taxes and held that the taxpayer could maintain the
suit in question by paying only a partial amount of the entire assessment
as long as the amount paid covered taxes due for any one document.
The most significant part of the Jones decision is the court's indication
that an excise tax by its nature is divisible or separable. Having taken
that position, the court concluded that the taxpayer could have main-
tained the suit simply by paying the tax due on the gross receipts from
one day's operation or by paying the total amount of tax due with re-
spect to the amount received from any one patron. In either situation,
the payment would have constituted full payment of the cabaret tax
imposed.
66. Id. at 318.
67. 162 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1958).
68. 20 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1937).
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Because Jones v. Fox was decided prior to the Supreme Court's
decision on Flora, one might question whether or not the exception
created by the decision is still intact. In Steele v. United States69 cer-
tain officers of a corporation were assessed penalties for willfully failing
to remit the withholding and social security taxes withheld from em-
ployees' wages to the Internal Revenue Service. Each then brought
a suit for refund. When the case came before the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, the government reversed the position that it had
taken in the district court and conceded that the amounts withheld as
to each employee represented separate taxes and that the penalties as-
serted with respect to the withholdings from any one individual were
entitled to be treated as divisible assessments. Accordingly, the full
payment rule established by the Flora case was not applicable. The
Steele case was cited with approval in Bongiovanni v. United States.70
Accordingly, it does seem clear enough that in the case of divisible or
separate taxes the Flora case does not apply, but because of the nature
of individual income taxes (assessed with respect to an entire year and
with respect to one taxpayer) the exception would not assist the aver-
age taxpayer in an income tax controversy.
Significance of the Termination of Year Cases
It should be remembered that, as to tax liability shown on a tax-
payer's return, if a taxpayer believes that he has incorrectly treated a
particular item to his detriment, his only remedy would be to file a
claim for refund and if that were not successful, a suit for refund in
the district court or the Court of Claims. Because a proposed defi-
ciency is not involved in that instance, there would be no right to have
the case decided by the Tax Court. Accordingly, it can be seen that
the term "deficiency" can have considerable significance.
The term "deficiency," in fact, did have considerable significance
in the recent case of Irving v. Gray.71 There, on February 4, 1972, the
Service notified the taxpayers that their year 1971 was being ter-
minated and their tax was due. The tax was immediately assessed in
a total amount of $512,111.00. On the same date, notices of levy were
served on Merrill Lynch to reach the taxpayers' funds in security ac-
counts. The government secured $91,332.92 through these levies, and
the taxpayers brought suit alleging that this sum must be returned for
69. 280 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1960).
70. 342 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Minn. 1972).
71. 479 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1973).
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distribution to the taxpayers' other creditors because the government
failed to issue a notice of deficiency after the assessment was made.
The taxpayers contended that the Internal Revenue Service, in
fact, had assessed a "deficiency" against them under the jeopardy
assessment provisions of section 6861 of the Code72 which requires that
the notice of deficiency be issued within sixty days after a jeopardy
assessment is made and that a notice of deficiency was not issued. The
taxpayers relied on Schreck v. United States73 where the taxpayer was
granted injunctive relief when the government terminated his tax year
and made a jeopardy assessment without issuing a notice of deficiency.
The taxpayers contended that not only would they be denied the right
to have their case adjudicated in the Tax Court because a notice of
deficiency was not issued but also they would be denied the right to
litigate their case in a refund action because under the Flora deci-
sion the full assessment must be paid before a refund suit can be main-
tained.
In the Irving case the government contended that the year 1971
had been terminated pursuant to section 685 174 of the Code and that
the assessment of tax due was made under section 6201(a)75 of the
72. Section 6861(a) provides:
Authority for Making.-If the Secretary or his delegate believes that the as-
sessment or collection of a deficiency, as defined in section 6211, will be jeo-
pardized by delay, he shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 6213(a),
immediately assess such deficiency (together with all interest, additional
amounts, and additions to the tax provided for by law), and notice and de-
mand shall be made by the Secretary or his delegate for the payment thereof.
73. 301 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1969), afrd, 375 F. Supp. 742 (D. Md. 1973).
74. Code § 6851 (a) (1) provides:
IN GENERAL.-If the Secretary or his delegate finds that a taxpayer designs
quickly to depart from the United States or to remove his property therefrom,
or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to do any other act tending
to prejudice or to render wholly or partly ineffectual proceedings to collect the
income tax for the current or the preceding taxable year unless such proceed-
ings be brought without delay, the Secretary or his delegate shall declare the
taxable period for such taxpayer immediately terminated, and shall cause notice
of such finding and declaration to be given the taxpayer, together with a de-
mand for immediate payment of the tax for the taxable period so declared
terminated and of the tax for the preceding taxable year or so much of such
tax as is unpaid, whether or not the time otherwise allowed by law for filing
return and paying the tax has expired; and such taxes shall thereupon become
immediately due and payable. In any proceeding in court brought to enforce
payment of taxes made due and payable by virtue of the provisions of this sec-
tion, the finding of the Secretary or his delegate, made as herein provided,
whether made after notice to the taxpayer or not, shall be for all purposes pre-
sumptive evidence of jeopardy.
75. Code § 6201(a)(1) provides in part:
Authority of Secretary or Delegate.-The Secretary or his delegate is author-
ized and required to make the inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all
taxes (including interest, additional amounts, additions to the tax, and assess-
able penalties) imposed by this title, or accruing under any former internal
revenue law, which have not been duly paid by stamp at the time and in the
17
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Code (rather than under section 6861 of the Code).
The court held that taxes declared to be due under section 6851,
which involves a taxpayer who is planning to depart from the United
States or to remove his property from the country or conceal himself
or his property within the country, do not constitute a "deficiency" and,
therefore, section 6861 which requires the issuance of a notice of de-
ficiency where a jeopardy assessment is made on a "deficiency" had
no applicability. The court cited with approval the definition of a defi-
ciency found in Williamson v. United States:6
That section [6211] defines a deficiency as the amount by
which the "tax imposed" exceeds the amount shown on
the tax return. The assessment in this case was not an im-
posed tax, but merely an amount which the I.R.S. believed
justified the termination of the taxable year. Since no return
had been filed at the date of the assessment, no deficiency
was determinable. 77
The court found that section 6201(a) granted authority for the
assessment stating, "But 6201 (a) is an alternative authorization for
IRS assessment which requires no deficiency letter." 78
The court took the position that it was erroneous to conclude that
no court other than the Tax Court could be available to determine par-
tial tax determinations made by the Service under section 6851(a). In
a footnote70 the court countered the taxpayers' argument that the Flora
case would bar suit if the total amount of the assessment were not paid
by indicating that the Flora rule is inapplicable in this situation because
no "deficiency" existed in this case and Flora related to a "deficiency"
type of case.
In the second opinion in the Schreck case, 0 the court referred
to the Second Circuit's statement in Irving to the effect that the first
Schreck opinion was in error insofar as it indicated that the Flora case
barred the taxpayers from instituting a refund suit. The second opin-
ion in Schreck expresses disagreement with the Irving case on this
point. The court stated: "[This Court continues to note the jurisdic-
manner provided by law. Such authority shall extend to and include the fol-
lowing:
Taxes shown on return.-The Secretary or his delegate shall assess all
taxes determined by the taxpayer or by the Secretary or his delegate as
to which returns or lists are made under this title ....
76. 31 AM. FED. TAX R.2d 73-800 (7th Cir. 1971).
77. 479 F.2d at 24.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 24 n.6.
80. 375 F. Supp. 742 (D. Md. 1973).
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tional construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) set forth in the Flora de-
cision.""' As previously indicated, the Schreck decision held that
where the taxpayer's year was terminated, section 6861 of the Code
was the applicable section under which the jeopardy assessment was
made (not section 6201), and, accordingly, a notice of deficiency was
required. The government has filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in the Schreck case. 82
The result in Schreck was followed in Rambo v. United States"8
where an injunction was granted to the taxpayer for return of his prop-
erty which was seized after the government terminated his tax year and
made an immediate assessment. In Rambo, the court rejected the gov-
ernment's position that the assessment was made under section 6201
of the Code and held that the assessment in fact was made under sec-
tion 6861 of -the Code which requires the issuance of a notice of defi-
ciency. The court concluded that a "deficiency" was involved because
no return had been filed by the taxpayer and that under section 6211
(a) of the Code a "deficiency" is ordinarily the amount by which the
tax imposed exceeds the tax liability shown on the taxpayer's return
but that the regulations indicate84 if no return is filed or if a return
is filed which shows no tax, the "deficiency" is the amount of tax prop-
erly imposed under the law. The court also indicated that because sec-
tions 6851 and 6861 both appear under -the heading "jeopardy" in the
Internal Revenue Code and because section 6851 does not in itself au-
thorize an assessment, it is reasonable to conclude that the assessment
provisions of section 6861 are applicable when a taxpayer's year is ter-
minated under section 6851. Accordingly, section 6201 was held to
be inapplicable in this situation.
Another recent case which involved the terminated year problem
is Lewis v. United States.8 5 In that case Lewis was arrested and charged
with an offense involving the possession of marijuana. At the time of
his arrest, drugs and cash in his possession were seized by the police.
Criminal charges against him were dismissed by a state judge. The
Internal Revenue Service terminated Lewis' tax year on June 14, 1972
and made an assessment against him in the amount of $27,261.85 for
the period January 1 through June 1972. A levy was then made on
81. Id. at 744.
82. P-H 1974 FED. TAxEs 1 61,000.
83. 492 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S.
July 10, 1974) (No. 73-2005).
84. Treas. Reg. § 301.6211-1(a).
85. 34 AM. FED. TAx R.2d 74-5167 (4th Cir. 1974).
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the $467 held by the local police department. Lewis brought a class
action against the United States alleging that his property had been
seized in violation of due process requirements. After the suit was
filed, the government returned the $467 to Lewis and abated the
jeopardy assessment. The government explained that the tax had been
mistakenly assessed for 1972 when it should have been assessed with
respect to 1971, the year in which Lewis was arrested. The court re-
fused to grant injunctive relief because it indicated that neither Lewis
nor members of a class would suffer irreparable harm because an ade-
quate remedy for refunds was provided. It then went on to state that
although a taxpayer must ordinarily pay the full amount of an assess-
ment before suing for a refund under the Flora decision, an exception
to that rule exists where the taxpayer's year has been terminated by
the Service, citing Irving as authority. But the court indicated that
Lewis had failed to take the necessary steps to perfect his claim. The
court stated, "if a taxpayer does not pay the full assessment for the
terminated period, he may nevertheless sue for a refund provided he
files returns for the terminated period and the full year. In this event,
the returns open the terminated period and serve as an informal claim
for refund."86
The Rambo case was recently followed in Hall v. United StatesI
where the taxpayer was granted an injunction in connection with prop-
erty which was seized pursuant to the termination of a tax year before
the normal period of the tax year had expired. In that case, the court
stated that the assessment which was made by the government although
purportedly made under section 6201 was in reality made under section
6861 and, therefore, a notice of deficiency was required. None had
been issued. It was indicated that the purpose of the Tax Court is
to permit taxpayers, particularly those who do not have the amount of
a proposed deficiency, to have their cases heard before their property
is levied upon and sold to pay the tax.
On the other hand, an injunction was recently refused the tax-
payer in a similar situation in Laing v. United States.88 In that case,"
the Second Circuit followed its prior decision in the Irving case and
took the position that although the taxpayer did not have the right to
take his case to the Tax Court because a notice of deficiency had not
86. Id. at 74-5170.
87. 493 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1974).
88. 496 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1974).
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been issued, the taxpayer could file a return showing the amount of
tax due and then sue to recover it.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently agreed to
grant certiorari in the Hall and Laing cases, 89 so this important and
ambiguous area may be clarified in the near future.
In determining whether or not a notice of deficiency is required
in the -termination of year cases, it is necessary to inquire as to whether
or not a "deficiency" exists. It seems clear that the government is of
the view that a deficiency does not exist because it presently is taking
the position that its assessment in these cases is made under section
6201 rather than under section 6861. Section 6861 authorizes the
jeopardy assessment of a "deficiency," and that section clearly provides
that a notice of deficiency must be issued within sixty days after the
assessment is made. In contending that the assessment is made under
section 6201, the government can take the position that the collection
simply involves original taxes shown on a return (rather than a defi-
ciency) and, accordingly, a notice of deficiency is not required.
The question of whether or not a deficiency exists in these cases
should be decided with reference to section 6211 of the code and the
regulations thereunder. It is noted that the regulations provide, 90 in
substance, that a "deficiency" is the excess of the amount of tax due
over that shown on the return. If a return is not filed or if no tax
is shown on a return that is filed, the amount of tax shown on the return
will be zero.
In view of the above, it does appear that the term "deficiency"
relates to the filing of a return. It has been contended that a return
is not required in the termination of year cases. 91 This argument has
been premised on the view that although section 443(a) of the Code
requires that a return be filed in termination of year cases, the regula-
tions under section 443 do not indicate when the return should be filed
or describe the type of return which should be filed. The regulations
simply refer to section 6851 and the regulations under that section.
89. Cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3187 (Oct. 15, 1974).
90. Treas. Reg. § 301.6211-1 (a) provides in part:
[Tihe term "deficiency" means the excess of the tax (income, estate, or gift
tax, as the case may be) over the sum of the amount shown as such tax by
the taxpayer upon his return and the amounts previously assessed (or collected
without assessment) as a deficiency; . . . If no return is made, or if the re-
turn . . . does not show any tax, for the purpose of the definition 'the amount
shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return' shall be considered as zero.
91. See Note, Termination of Taxable Year: Procedures in Jeopardy, 26 TAx LAW
Rlvimw 829 (1971).
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Once that section is examined, one might conclude that specific re-
quirements for a return are set forth only with respect to departing
aliens. For United States citizens, that section would require a return
only for the full taxable year. It would then follow that if no return
is due for the short period of the year prior to termination, in the case
of either a United States citizen or an alien who is not departing the
United States, a return could not be filed on his behalf by the District
Director under section 6020(b) of the Code. If a return is not re-
quired, the argument can be advanced that there might not be authority
for computing and imposing the tax.
On the other hand, section 443(a)(3) of the Code itself does re-
quire that a return be filed in termination of year cases.9 2 But as indi-
cated above, the regulations under section 443 do not indicate the type
of return to be filed or when it should be filed.
In a termination of year case, the return is filed by the District
Director under section 6020(b)(1) of the Code on behalf of the tax-
payer. 93 In stating that the District Director can file a return for a tax-
payer who fails to file a required return "at the time prescribed there-
for," the Code and Regulations seem to support those who argue that
a return is not required in termination of year cases. As indicated
above, the Regulations do not prescribe a time for the taxpayer to file
a return in these situations. But section 6020 grants the Secretary
permission to file a return for a taxpayer who fails to file any return
that is required by any internal revenue law or regulation.
Assuming that there is a return requirement in these cases, the
amount collected by the District Director would be treated as original
tax collected with respect to the return. If a return is not due, then
the assessment under section 6201 would appear to be incorrect in view
of the fact that the termination of year cases do not fall within any of
the four categories described under section 6201 as instances under
92. Code § 443(a) (3) provides:
TERMINATION OF TAXABLE YEAR FOR JEOPARDY.-When the Secretary or his
delegate terminates the taxpayer's taxable year under section 6851 (relating to
tax in jeopardy).
93. Treas. Reg. § 301.6020-1(b) (1) provides in part:
Execution of returns-(1) In general. If any person required by any internal
revenue law or by the regulations prescribed thereunder to make a return
(other than a declaration of estimated tax required under section 6015 or
6016) fails to make such return at the time prescribed therefore, or makes will-
fully or otherwise, a false or fraudulent return, the district director or other
authorized internal revenue officer or employee shall make such return from
his own knowledge and from such information as he can obtain through testi-
mony or otherwise.
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which the Secretary may make assessments of tax.04
But even if the return is due and properly filed by the District
Director under section 6020 of the Code, although the assessment
would then appear proper under section 6201, and ordinarily, collec-
tion proceedings may be based on a valid assessment, it is noted that
section 6851 appears to contemplate a court proceeding. 5 It should
be noted in this regard that the Code refers to acts of the taxpayer
tending to render ineffectual "proceedings to collect the income tax."
The Code also uses the phrase, "In any proceeding in court brought
to enforce payment of taxes made due and payable by virtue of the
provisions of this section. ... 1 In contrast with this language is the
language used in section 6331, the section which grants the Secretary
authority to levy and distrain on a taxpayer's property. In referring
to the administrative collection procedure contemplated by the statute,
that section refers to "levy upon all property and rights to property"
and it provides that the term "levy" includes "the power of distraint
and seizure by any means. 97
The difference in the wording between section 6851 and 6331
leads one to conclude that a court proceeding is contemplated by sec-
tion 6851. If, in fact, a court proceeding is required, the result of that
requirement would appear to be desirable for two reasons. First, there
is no deficiency involved and the taxpayer, therefore, is not able to peti-
tion the Tax Court to determine the validity of the tax liability asserted
by the government. Second, the taxpayer might not be able to bring
a suit for refund because the total amount of liability shown on the re-
turn filed on his behalf by the District Director will likely exceed the
amount of tax collected by the District Director. Although Flora in-
volved a deficiency, the Flora doctrine also would appear to apply to
original taxes shown on a return.
Requiring the government to institute a suit for collection in these
cases should provide the taxpayer with the ability to inquire into the
decision of the District Director to terminate the year. If the taxpayer
is unable to show that the action of the District Director was arbitrary
and without foundation, the procedure would be upheld. When the
94. The four categories enumerated in section 6201(a) are: (1) taxes shown on
return; (2) unpaid taxes payable by stamp; (3) erroneous income tax prepayment cred-
its; (4) erroneous credit under section 39.
95. See note 74 supra.
96. Code § 6851(a).
97. Code § 6331 grants the Secretary authority to collect by levy upon property and
all rights to property. Section 6331(b) provides in part: "The term 'levy' as used in
this title includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means."
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year ended, the taxpayer could file his tax return for the entire taxable
year and if it indicated a liability less than that already collected by
the District Director, the taxpayer could file a claim for refund and,
ultimately, a suit for refund.
It is believed that in a termination of year case, the return exe-
cuted by the District Director on behalf of the taxpayer formalizes a
specific amount of tax liability on which the "proceedings" contem-
plated by section 6851 may be based. The entire procedure, in sub-
stance, is a collection procedure which seeks to insure collection of the
tax where the District Director believes that collection might be preju-
diced by acts of the taxpayer. Requiring the government to institute
legal proceedings to effect this unusual collection procedure but giving
the taxpayer the right to question the propriety of such a proceeding
would be a means of insuring collection of the revenue while protecting
the rights of the taxpayer against arbitrary action. One might argue that
if the taxpayer were able to maintain a suit for refund immediately after
collection takes place, his rights would be adequately protected. Such
a proceeding would be difficult, however, because of the difficulty in
determining the exact amount of tax due for only the terminated part of
the year. Although the government makes such a determination, it is
done only as part of a collection procedure. It is not done in the sense
of finalizing the taxpayer's liability for that period of time.
CONCLUSION
In seeking a tax refund, the taxpayer should be thoroughly familiar
with the procedural and substantive rules relating to filing claims for
refund and suits for refunds. The rules relating to timeliness and con-
tent of claims for refund are particularly important because if these
rules are not strictly followed, the district court or the Court of Claims
will lack jurisdiction to consider a suit for refund. The rules relating
to when taxes are deemed paid and when returns are treated as filed
are important. In this connection, the Rosenman doctrine is significant
where payment is made pursuant to discussions with an internal reve-
nue agent. The rule of the Flora case requires the entire tax to be
paid before a suit for refund can be maintained. The Flora case has
come into question in connection with several recent cases involving
termination of a taxpayer's year. The Supreme Court is expected to
clarify this area in the near future when it decides the Hall and Laing
cases.
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